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CURRENT EMISSION STANDARDS, REFINING,
AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY*
by Paul E. Bermingham* *
The operant structure of the petroleum industry is underpinned
by four essential functions: exploration and production, refining, trans-
portation, and marketing. Of the four, the refining or manufacturing
function has experienced the major thrust of state and federal environ-
mental legislation directed toward the regulation of petroleum industry
emissions. The compass of this article is directed toward the pollution
problems relating to petroleum refining,1 but it should be noted that
many of the laws, restrictions, and policies analyzed herein are equally
applicable to users of other industrial processes begetting emissions.
2
I. WATER POLLUTION
Investigation of effluent discharge by refineries into neighboring
waterways is an appropriate initial consideration because it was in this
area that the federal government first immersed itself. The baptism took
place with the enactment of the Rivers and Harbors Acts of 1890 and
1899.4  Section 13 of the latter Act has gained independent recognition
as the Refuse Act. Ironically, this nineteenth century legislation, passed
to combat not pollution but impediments to navigation,5 has today be-
come a major weapon in the federal arsenal to protect our waterways
* The text of this article is an adaption of a paper presented by Mr. Bermingham
to the Refining Division of the American Petroleum Institute in May 1971.
** B.A. 1931, Colgate University; LL.B. 1934, Columbia University.
1. The various components of the petroleum business are, of course, closely related,
and where a complete discussion of refining requires it, aspects of the other functions
will be considered. For example, marketing requirements for low sulphur fuel oils
clearly affect refinery operations and have led to the implementation of processes such
as catalytic hydrogen-desulphurization to reduce the fuel's sulphur levels.
2. Although the word "emissions" is generally thought of, in an environmental con-
text, as applying to discharges into the air, when used in the context of petroleum re-
fining its meaning must be expanded to include effluent discharges into water, noise,
odors, and other receptor effects.
3. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 6, 26 Stat. 453.
4. Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1899,
ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152).
5. See generally Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888) (holding
an Act of Congress was necessary to bring obstructions of navigable waterways within
federal jurisdiction).
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against environmental threats.6 The irony is more striking yet in that
as long ago as 1948 Congress began enacting laws specifically aimed at
water pollution. The original Water Pollution Control Act of 1948,7
has been supplemented by additional legislation on the same subject in
1956,8 1961, 9 1965,10 1966,11 1970,12 and 1971.1' Bills pending at
the time this paper was being prepared may well add further regulatory
refinements in 1972.14 Over a period of more than twenty years there
has been no dearth of legislative attention directed toward resolving
the problem of water pollution. 15 With all of this activity, it is a rather
sad commentary that a law from the last century designed to stop the
clogging of navigable channels' 6 has been dusted off for use in the
6. In recent years the government has filed lawsuits against various corporations for
water polluting acts. The defendant corporations include Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
Bellingham, Wash.; Olin Corp., Niagara Falls, N.Y.; Oxford Paper Co., Rumford,
Me.; Weyerhaeuser Co., Longview, Wash.; Olin Corp., Augusta, Ga.; Diamond Sham-
rock Corp., Delaware City, Del.; Diamond Shamrock Corp., Muscle Shoals, Ala.;
Allied Chemical Co., Solvay, N.Y.; International Mining and Chemical Co., Chlor-
Alkali Division, Orrington, Me.; and Pennwalt Chemical Co., Calvert City, Ky.
1 B.N.A. ENVIRONMENT REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 349 (1970).
7. Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1151-75 (1970)).
8. Water Pollution Control Act Amendment of 1956, ch. 518, § 1, 70 Slat. 498,
amending Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153-55, 1157-60, 1171-74 (1970)).
9. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75
Stat. 204, amending Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153-55, 1158-60, 1171-73 (1970)).
10. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Slat. 903, amending
Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1151-60, 1171-74 (1970)).
11. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, §§ 101-210, 80 Stat.
1246, amending Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1155-58, 1160, 1173, 1175 (1970)).
12. Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224,
84 Stat. 91, amending Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Slat. 1155 (1948)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1155-56, 1158, 1160-75 (1970)).
13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act-Extension, Pub. L. No. 92-50, 85 Slat. 124
(1971). This law is merely an extension of funding authorization for a three-month
period, but a substantive enactment should be expected when this extension terminates.
14. S. 523 and S. 1014, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Senate Bill 523 is sponsored
by Senator Muskie of Maine and Bill 1014 is sponsored by Senator Cooper of Ken-
tucky. Senate hearings on both bills were held March 15 through March 24, 1971.
15. Even more attention may be focused on environmental protection in 1972, an
election year.
16. Several early cases which interpreted the Refuse Act only found the Act to be
violated when refuse interfered with navigation. See, e.g., United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Longstrean v. Owen McCaffrey's Sons, 95 Conn.
486, 111 A. 788 (1920); Brush v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 322, 138 A. 860
(1927).
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modem struggle against pollution. The anomaly of using an 1899
navigational law to deal with non-navigational 1971 pollution will be
further discussed following a brief review of the current federal laws
enacted to deal with pollution itself.
Federal water pollution legislation, instead of reposing complete
authority in either the states or the national government, provides for a
partnership arrangement.1 The law seemingly promotes the states to
senior partner status as a result of the congressional declaration that the
national policy is "[t]o recognize, preserve and protect the primary re-
sponsibilities and fights of the States in preventing and controlling water
pollution ... ."18 Actually, however, the federal voice is as strong,
if not stronger, than that of the states. In the main this can be attributed
to two factors. First, Washington controls the purse strings.' 9 Second,
the senior rights of the states establish palpably no more than an initial
opportunity for states to create water quality standards for all interstate
waters within their boundaries,20 since any promulgated standards,
together with plans for their implementation and enforcement, must be
approved in Washington. 2 When a state does not exercise this oppor-
tunity or if, having done so, its proposals are not countenanced by the
federal government, the latter has the discretion to prescribe standards
applicable to the interstate waters in that state.
22
The federal law allowing states to establish standards was couched,
17. See Pollution Control of Navigable Waters Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
18. Id. § 1151.
19. Id. § 1157.
20. Id. § 1160(c)(1).
21. Id.
22. While the states have the initial opportunity to set water quality standards, the
power to enforce the standards and proceed against violators is vested in the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970,
§§ 2(a)(1), (3), 35 Fed. Reg. 15623, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 6322 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Reorganization Plan]. The enforcement procedure begins with a
conference between federal government authorities and state and interstate water pollu-
tion agencies at which the various water pollution violations, as well as present abate-
ment procedures, are reviewed. At the conclusion of the conference remedial measures
are agreed upon and presented to the state. If after six months the pollution violations
continue, the Administrator is required to call a public hearing during which interested
parties, including the alleged polluters, are allowed to testify. Following the hearing,
the Hearing Board recommends abatement measures to the Administrator, who then
notifies the alleged polluters of the findings and issues notification that violations
must be abated within a specified time, not less than six months. If the violations con-
tinue, the Administrator may request the attorney general to seek legal action if the
violation concerns interstate pollution. If intrastate pollution is involved, the Adminis-
trator must have the consent of the state's governor in order to initiate the request. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1160(d)-(g) (1970).
1972]
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as first propounded, in language touching only upon the quality of the
receiving waters.23 There was no obligation upon the states to establish
any standards governing the quality of the effluents spewed into those
waters.24  It is indeed possible that this omission may impede the ad-
ministration of a sound pollution abatement program. 5 Pending legisla-
tion would close this gap, however, by directing the addition to state
water quality standards of effluent requirements imposing specific limita-
tions on individual sources of pollution.26 More importantly, these
proposals would broaden the ambit of water quality standards to include
not only interstate waters, as the law now provides, but also all naviga-
ble waters.27  This broadened concept was utilized in the 1970 amend-
ment to the Water Pollution Control Act in provisions dealing specifi-
cally with oil spills and measures to remove such discharges.28 This 1970
legislation, which affects all refiners, bears upon their liability for the
discharge of oil into the navigable waters of the United States in quan-
titles determined to be harmful under federal regulations.20
Oil spills,30 as well as discharges of designated hazardous polluting
substances other than oil, 1 are areas wherein the federal government
has intervened directly without first, as in the case of water quality
standards, providing the states an opportunity to act. The federal in-
trusion into this field is in large part the result of such mishaps as oc-
curred in the grounding and subsequent breaking up of the tanker Torrey
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(1) (1970). See also Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758,
62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970)).
24. The states could, however, obtain federal funding for construction of sewage
treatment works. 33 U.S.C. § 1158 (1970).
25. If effluents may be freely discharged until the receiving waters are just short of
qualifying as polluted, not only will the quality of the waterway be changed but the
risk of an accidental "over-discharge" which may permanently damage the waterway is
magnified considerably.
26. S. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1014, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
27. Id.
28. Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224,
84 Stat. 91.
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(b) (2) (1970) provides:
The discharge of oil into or upon the navigable waters of the United States,
adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone in harmful
quantities as determined by the President under paragraph (3) of this subsection,
is prohibited, except (A) in the case of such discharges into the waters of the
contiguous zone, where permitted under article IV of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, as amended, and (B)
where permitted in quantities and at times and locations or under such circum-
stances or conditions as the President may, by regulation, determine not to be
harmful. Any regulations issued under this subsection shall be consistent with
maritime safety and with marine and navigation laws and regulations and appli-
cable water quality standards.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 1162.
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Canyon3 2 and the Santa Barbara Channel oil leak.13  The 1970 enact-
ment is designed to cope with similar spills by providing for their con-
tainment and cleanup and by establishing financial responsibility for
resulting costs. 34  But the states are not precluded from legislating in
this area unless they attempt either to usurp an exclusive federal domain
such as maritime law or to establish rules that are inconsistent with
federal practice. Several states have in fact enacted laws and regulations
of their own dealing with discharges of oil and other hazardous sub-
stances.35 Moreover, pending federal legislation would authorize the
additional establishment of federal effluent standards for hazardous
substances designated by regulations.36 Although state machinery and
procedures would be shunted thereby, states would remain free to fashion
their own standards should they so choose.
The existing regulations specifying what quantities of oil 3' are deemed
harmful when discharged into navigable water of the United States
are quite brief.3 8  They contain two prohibitions. One declares un-
lawful the discharge of any quantity of oil which would violate appli-
cable water quality standards 3 9 The other, and potentially more
troublesome restriction for the petroleum industry, provides that any
discharge is harmful if it causes a film or sheen, or causes a sludge or
32. See Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENY. L.
400 (1967), for a discussion of the magnitude of this unfortunate accident.
33. See Krueger, Offshore Petroleum, Pollution and Politics: The Impact of Santa
Barbara on Continental Shelf Development, 15 THE LANDMAN, Aug. 1970, at 14.
34. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2691 (1970).
35. See, e.g., Maine Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act, MAINE REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 541-57 (Supp. 1972); Massachusetts Clean Waters Act,
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 21, H8 50-50B (Supp. 1972); Florida Oil Spill Pre-
vention and Pollution Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. H8 376.011-376.21 (Supp.
1970). The Florida law has been declared unconstitutional because it intruded into
the exclusive federal jurisdiction over maritime matters and because it was in conflict
with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. American Waterways Operator v.
Askew, 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., DECISIONS 1429 (M. D. Fla. 1971).
36. S. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1014, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
37. "'Oil' means oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to,
petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, oil mixed with ballast or bilge, and oil mixed
with wastes other than dredged spoil." 18 C.F.R. § 610.1(a) (1971).
38. The federal legislation directed toward oil pollution extends the jurisdictional
scope beyond navigable waters to include waters of the contiguous zone. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1161(b)(1) (1970). This zone in effect extends 12 miles from the low water line
along the coast. The contiguous zone presents various perplexing problems which neces-
sarily do not affect land based oil refineries. See Keener, Federal Water Pollution
Legislation and Regulations with Particular Reference to the Oil Industry, 4 NAT. RE-
SouRcES LAw. 484, 491-94 (1971).
39. 18 C.F.R. § 610.3(a) (1971).
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emulsion to be deposited beneath the surface of the water.4 Sheen is
defined as "an iridescent apearance on the surface of the water. 41
"'Sludge' means an aggregate of oil or oil and other matter of any kind
in any form other than dredged spoil having a specific gravity equiva-
lent to or greater than water.
'42
Literal application of these definitions of sludge and sheen could lead
to implausible results unless further interpretations are forthcoming.
Under certain conditions, such as very calm, stationary waters, an
effluent containing an eye-dropper of oil could cause, at least for a brief
period, a discernible sheen. A single particle of coke or other hydro-
carbon material heavier than water seems to fall within the definition of
sludge. If the language of the regulation is to be given its literal Eng-
lish meaning, such discharges violate the law. As so construed, any per-
son in charge of a facility, such as a refinery, where a discharge of this
kind occurs and who has acquired knowledge of the discharge is sub-
ject to a fine of $10,000 or a year in jail or both unless he immediately
reports it to an appropriate governmental agency. 8 In addition, if the
oil was knowingly discharged, the owner of the facility may be assessed
a civil penalty up to $10,000 for each separate offense. 44 The applica-
tion of the foregoing sanction to a continuous refinery discharge of
water containing tiny globules of oil in such quantities as to be perfectly
harmless as a practical matter but nevertheless discernible as a sheen
taxes the imagination. In an around-the-clock refinery operation just
what is a separate offense-each drop, quart, gallon or barrel of effluent
or each second, minute, hour or day of discharge? In this state of per-
plexity some refiners are trying to work out practical arrangements with
their local Coast Guard personnel and this author can at this time
offer no better solution.
Besides minimal discharges of refinery effluents that may cause
sheens or sludge but are in no other sense really harmful, oil refineries
must be concerned with the possibility of substantial spills of oil due
to accidents or negligence. The owner or operator of an onshore
facility from which such a discharge occurs will be liable for the cleanup
costs, up to $8,000,000, unless he can maintain the affirmative defense
40. Id. § 610.3(b).
41. Id. § 610.1(1).
42. Id. § 610.1(m).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(b) (4) (1970).
44. Id. § 1161(b)(5). Proposed legislation by Senator Muskie of Maine would
define each day as the definition of a separate offense. It would also provide
that the federal government would not purchase goods and services of a person
convicted of a knowing water pollution violation until the condition is corrected. S. 523,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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that the spill was caused solely by an act of God, act of war, negligence
by the federal government, or an act or omission of some third party.45
Moreover, if the government can carry the burden of proving that the
spill was the result of willful negligence or misconduct, the refinery own-
er or operator will be liable for the full amount of the cleanup costs.
46
All of this may come as a shock to many refinery managers. Others
may shrug it off as not being applicable to their refineries located far
inland, hundreds of miles away from anything a reasonable man would
construe as a navigable waterway. A man from Colorado may say with
some practical justification that the South Platte flowing or trickling
through Denver is hardly a navigable waterway of the United States
when he cannot float a canoe or rowboat on it. He is in store for a
shock. The South Platte and perhaps most, if not all, waterways in
this country on which a refinery is located or into which its effluents
are channeled or piped are navigable waters of the United States.
Although it is not defined in the statute, the term "navigable
waters" has a well-understood and very broad legal meaning. It is not
limited to our coastal waters and broad rivers-such as the Mississippi,
the Missouri, the Ohio, the Hudson-where the constant sight of marine
traffic clearly makes them navigable. The phrase "navigable waters of
the United States" includes as a matter of law, as distinguished from
actual practice, bodies of water that have not floated a vessel of any
kind for a hundred or more years. The guidelines our courts have es-
tablished for determining navigability are interesting both to lawyers
and laymen; moreover, they are so broad that sometimes both are
amazed.
A body of water is navigable if it meets any one of three tests. The
first and most obvious standard includes waterways which are currently
being used for the transportation of persons or property in interstate
or foreign commerce. 47  A second test provides that a waterway is
navigable if it can be made suitable for the above-mentioned commerce
by reasonable improvements or artificial aids even though such altera-
tions have not yet been proposed. 48 The third criterion includes water-
ways that were once used as navigable waterways although such use has
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(f)(2) (1970).
46. Id.
47. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 557, 563 (1870).
48. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08 (1940).
The court stated that "Congress has recognized this in § 3 of the Water Power Act by
defining 'navigable waters' as those 'which either in their natural or improved condition'
are used or suitable for use." Id. at 407.
1972I
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long since been abandoned.49 For example, a branch of a river which
had been used for transporting furs in canoes and light boats was held to
be navigable in 1921 even though it had not been so used since 1825.50
Navigability need not be continuous either in time or in distance to
make an entire stream a navigable waterway.51 Even if only a portion
of its course is actually navigable, and then only for a part of the year,
that is enough to make the entire river a navigable water of the United
States. This is true although falls, shallows or rapids may compel
portage over a portion of its route.5 2  Tributaries, even though non-
navigable themselves, are includable within the definition if their ob-
struction would affect the navigability of the waterways which they
feed.53 Federal jurisdiction may still attach even though the waterway
involved is contained entirely within the boundaries of a single state
with no external water connection crossing state lines. 4 It is enough
if the body of water in conjunction with other modes of transportation,
such as a railroad, provides a means for the continuous portage of
goods in interstate commerce. 55  Under these principles the only
body of water that can possibly escape classification as part of the
navigable waters of the United States would be a stream, pond or lake
which has no connection with other navigable waters, as previously
defined, and which is not used, never was used and could not with
reasonable expenditures be used as part of a chain in an interstate or
foreign movement, by water or otherwise, for the carriage of goods or
people. It is difficult to imagine any body of water serving a petroleum
industry installation, whether it be a refinery, a marketing facility or an
oil or gas well, that is not a navigable waterway of the United States. 0
Returning to the Refuse Act of 1899, an attempt is being made to
49. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123-24 (1921);
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 344 F.2d 594, 596 (2d Cir.
(1965).
50. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 117 (1921).
51. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 409-10 (1940).
52. Id. at 409.
53. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 709 (1899); Ap-
palachian Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 6, 16-17 (W.D. Va.), rev'd on
other grounds, 67 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1933).
54. The Katie, 40 F. 480, 492 (S.D. Ga. 1889).
55. Id. at 489.
56. An exception would be an off-shore drilling rig on the outer continental shelf
beyond the three-mile limit. That limit marks the seaward boundary of the navigable
waters of the United States. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Samuels, 407 S.W.2d 839
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966). Oil spills from shelf rigs are, however, covered by regulations
promulgated under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43
(1970).
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employ a little-used permit section of that law to control discharges of
pollutants into navigable waters.57  In light of the current emphasis
being placed on this statute, it is helpful to review briefly the judicial
background and construction of the Refuse Act. Although the Act
was aimed at impediments to navigation, 58 its confusing syntax has
produced results having no relationship to navigation. The Act con-
tains two basic prohibitions separated by a semicolon. 59 The first pro-
hibition makes unlawful the discharge of any refuse matter, other than
liquid sewage, into navigable waters; the second outlaws the depositing
of any material on the banks of navigable waters where it may be washed
into such waters. Following these two prohibitions is the phrase "where-
by navigation . . . may be impeded." Because a semi-colon separates
the first from the second prohibition, each has been construed to stand
alone and, consequently, the navigation impediment language modifies
only the second prohibition.6" Thus, refuse dumping covered by the
first prohibition is unlawful, regardless of its effect on navigation. 6' The
term "refuse' has been held to include particles of industrial solid wastes
suspended in water62 and materials of commercial value not commonly
57. Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
58. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970) provides:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or pro-
cure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge,
or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing es-
tablishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description what-
ever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a
liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of
any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navi-
gable water; and it shall not be lawful to deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to
be deposited material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water,
or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be
liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or
by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or
obstructed .... (emphasis added)
60. United States v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford, Inc., 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952).
61. Id. at 370. In La Merced, 84 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1936), the Court stated that
refuse was not limited to matter impeding or obstructing navigation and held that oil
was refuse within the meaning of the Act. Even under the second prohibition where
navigation must be impeded in order for jurisdiction under the Refuse Act to attach,
the increased broadening of the definition of "navigable" (see text accompanying notes
46-56 supra) had had a positive effect on the applicability of the Act. The Fort
Fetterman v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 261 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1958); United
States v. Romard, 89 F. 156 (2d Cir. 1898); Armory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass.
240, 72 N.E.2d 549 (1947).
62. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 490-91 (1960). There, the
deposits were held not to be within the exception language of the Act which excludes
matters which flow from streets and pass therefrom in a liquid state. The Court nar-
rowly construed the wording of the Act and held that only "sewage" was meant to be
included within the exception.
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considered discards or waste, such as aviation gasoline accidentally
discharged into a navigable river.68
The act provides further that any discharge of refuse into the navi-
gable waters of the United States is unlawful unless authorized by a per-
mit obtained from the Army Corps of Engineers.64 The Army is au-
thorized to issue permits for the discharge of refuse when no impediments
to anchorage or navigation are created. 5 Until recently, no refiner had
applied for a permit covering his effluent discharges because these dis-
charges were not considered threats to anchorage or navigation. There
have been such applications for physical installations such as outfalls,
conduits or other facilities carrying refinery discharges into navigable
waters that might constitute impediments to navigation. 0 Now, how-
ever, this permit provision is being applied to require comprehensive
licensing of all who would discharge any pollutants into any navigable
waters. 6r It is estimated that 40,000 such permits will be needed for
existing installations.
68
An amusing but perplexing paradox in this scheme arises from
63. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966). In Standard Oil Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, confirmed the view that the phrase "whereby naviga-
tion shall or may be impeded or obstructed" applied only to the second prohibition of
section 407. As such, Justice Douglas determined that commercially valuable aviation
gasoline was included within the Act, stating: "Oil is oil and whether usable or not
by industrial standards it has the same deleterious effect on waterways. In either case,
its presence in our rivers and harbors is both a menace to navigation and a pollutant."
Id. at 226.
64. Refuse Act § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Violation of the Refuse Act is a crim-
inal offense and criminal penalties may be imposed. Violators can be fined up to $2500
and sentenced to jail for not more than one year. Id. § 411. In addition, equitable
remedies have been allowed by the courts in the past for violation of the Act. In
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960), the Supreme Court of the
United States allowed the government's petition for injunctive relief. Other cases af-
firming the right of civil redress under the Refuse Act include United States v. Perma
Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Donaldson-Schultz Co., 148
F. 581 (4th Cir. 1906).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). A court recently held that, under the language of
the Refuse Act, the Army Corps of Engineers may not issue permits, as it has done
in the past, for discharges into non-navigable waters. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1971). Subsequent to this decision the Army has discontinued the practice.
Proposed amendments to the federal Water Pollution Control Act (S. 2770), however,
incorporate the permit system and make it applicable to all waters. 40 U.S.L.W. 1098
(Jan. 4, 1972).
66. Such installations appear to come directly under the purview of regulations
formulated by the Army. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (1971).
67. Exec. Order No. 11574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1971), 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
68. White House Fact Sheet accompanying President Nixon's statement of Dec. 23,
1970, on initiation of a permit program under the Refuse Act. 21 BNA ENVIRON-
MENT REP., FEDERAL LAws 292 (1971).
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the attempt of the Army to coordinate and dovetail its rejuvenated per-
mit authority with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
regulations formulated under authority granted by the Water Pollution
Control Act.69 Since these latter EPA regulations prohibit the dis-
charge of oil in harmful quantities,70 the Army has indicated it will
issue no permits for this type of discharge. 71 This seems like a rational
accommodation with a law specifically covering such discharges. But
having carved out that exception, the Army seems to be saying that if
an oil discharge is not prohibited by the Water Pollution Control Act
because it is harmless and, therefore, not unlawful under that statute,
it nevertheless is unlawful under the Refuse Act unless a permit is ob-
tained from the Army.72
From the perspective of a refiner having an operation which employs
continuous water discharges, he is placed in an almost impossible
position. The effluent contains miniscule particles of oil that either
cannot under known technology be completely removed or, if they
can, the cost of removal far outweighs any of its possible benefits. If
such particles cause a sheen or sludge, the refiner is a violator of the
Water Pollution Control Act and he can expect no help from the Army
by way of a permit. But even if he does not violate the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act because the oil globules in his refinery effluent do
not cause a sheen or sludge, the refinery may still be in trouble under
the Refuse Act unless a permit can be obtained from the Army for such
harmless discharges. This type of administrative regulation is currently
being challenged in a pending lawsuit. It is being urged that if oil
discharges are to be covered by regulations under the Water Pollution
Control Act, then that Act must necessarily preempt the Refuse Act
and its accompanying permit system."'
II. Am POLLUTION
Until recently the federal government moved more slowly on the
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(1) (1970).
70. 18 C.F.R. H9 610.1-.9 (1971).
71. Proposed Army Corps Eng'r Reg. 209.131(d) (7), 35 Fed. Reg. 20006 (1970).
72. Id. § 209.131(d)(1), 35 Fed. Reg. 20005 (1970). If a discharge is not pro-
hibited under the F.W.P.C.A., the Army Corps of Engineers may still, under the Refuse
Act, deny a permit in three different situations:
(1) If the discharge will impair anchorage or navigation; (2) if the District En-
gineer, after consultations required by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, deter-
mines that the discharge will have a harmful effect on fish or wildlife resources; and
(3) if the issuance of the permit would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Refuse
Act. Id. § 209.131(d)(2), 35 Fed. Reg. 20005.
73. United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., Civ. No. 70-V-6 (S.D. Tex., filed 1970).
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air pollution front than it had in connection with polluted waters. 74  It
was not until 1955-seven years after the Water Pollution Control Act
of 1948-that Congress legislated the federal government into the field
of air pollution regulation. 5 By 1967, a series of federal laws enacted
in 1964,76 1965, 77 and 1967,7' had made applicable to air much of the
philosophy and procedural arrangements previously written into the
water program, including the issuance of criteria by the federal govern-
ment79 and an opportunity to the states to adopt their own standards in
light of those criteria.80 This was in recognition of the principle that
"the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary
responsibility of States and local governments. ... 81
As in the case of water, however, if a state failed to exercise its pre-
rogative by adopting standards or if those adopted were found inade-
quate by Washington, the latter was authorized to promulgate federal
standards for that state.8 2  An exception to this concept of placing pri-
mary responsibility on state and local government was made with re-
spect to automobiles. The inpracticability of compelling car manufac-
turers to comply with fifty different state laws on automotive emissions
caused Congress to preempt the field by authorizing the federal govern-
74. Due to the alarming increase in air pollution Congress was forced to enact
legislation attempting to deal with the problem. The regulatory scheme adopted has
been approved by the federal courts. United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287
F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 904 (1970).
75. Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970)).
76. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, amending Act of July 14, 1955,
ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970)).
77. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992, amending Clean Air Act,
Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970)).
78. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, amending Clean
Air Act, Pub. L No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970)).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(b) (1970).
80. Id. § 1857d(c).
81. Id. § 1857(a)(3).
82. Id. § 1857d(c)(2). Air quality standards can be established by state action if
the governor of a state files with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, with-
in 90 days after receiving air quality criteria promulgated by the Secretary, a letter
expressing the state's intent to adopt air quality standards within 180 days. If within
180 days after the establishment of standards the state augments them with a plan for
their implementation, maintenance and enforcement, and if the standards and plans
are consistent with the air quality criteria issued by the Secretary, the standards then
become officially established for that state.
If a state does not file a letter of intent or establish air quality standards, the
Secretary is enabled to propose regulations setting forth needed air quality standards
consistent with the designated criteria and recommended control techniques. The Secre-
tary's standards become applicable to the state if within six months after their proposal
the state has not adopted its own standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c) (1), (2) (1970).
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ment to establish national standards for emissions from new motor ve-
hicles83 and by disallowing the states from adopting their own standards
relating to the control of emissions from motor engines. s4  An excep-
tion to this exception was engrafted for California. Its longer exper-
ience in the southern part of the State with smog problems, particularly
from automobile emissions, and its earlier laws and regulations appli-
cable to these emissions justified granting California permission to en-
force its own stricter standards.8 5
In another important respect the air statute went beyond its water
counterpart. The latter contemplated only the establishment of stand-
ards for the receiving waters into which effluents are discharged, not for
the effluents themselves. Under the air law, however, the implementa-
tion plans to be formulated by each state in support of its ambient air
standards must contain emission limitations applicable to the source or
classes of sources of various discharges."6 As previously noted, pend-
ing legislation would provide for similar source controls in the case of
effluent discharges into our waterways.
Major additions were made to the body of federal air legislation
by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.s ' Of particular interest to re-
finers are the provisions authorizing the EPA, which has recently as-
sumed air and water pollution jurisdiction from the Department of the
Interior and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,88 to issue
criteria for pollutants emitted from numerous or diverse mobile or sta-
tionary sources having an adverse effect on public health or welfare.8 9
The EPA was directed, based upon its evaluation of these criteria, to
promulgate regulations prescribing not only a national primary am-
bient air quality standard with respect to each pollutant injurious to
public health but also a national secondary standard to protect public
welfare. 0 This approach greatly increases the power and authority of
the federal government to cope with air pollution on a national level
by giving it, instead of the states, the principal responsibility in estab-
83. Id. § 1857f-1.
84. Id. § 1857f-6a(a).
85. Id. § 1857f-6a(b).
86. H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); S. REP. No. 403, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
87. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970)).
88. Reorganization Plan, supra note 22, § 2(a)(3). See Manaster, The Develop-
ment of Federal Water Pollution Control: The Present and the Future, 1971 U. ILL.
L.F. 36, 48-49.
89. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4, 84 Stat. 1676.
90. Id.
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lishing standards for major pollutants. This enlargement of national
jurisdiction at the expense of the states was, however, coupled with the
reiteration that the basic premise of the earlier underlying legislation
that "each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air
quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State," ' 1
is to be maintained. What is left to the states under this type of division
is nothing more than the opportunity to promulgate implementation
plans for the achievement of the federal standards. The attainment
of such standards must be accomplished in the case of primary standards
within a maximum of three years after the EPA has approved a state's
plans.92  If a state fails to take advantage of this opportunity, or if its
implementation plan is unacceptable, the EPA is authorized to pro-
mulgate a federal implementation plan of its own. 93
The 1970 amendments clarify with greater particularity than did
earlier provisions what the necessary contents of the state implementa-
tion plans must be in order to meet the federal standards. To be in-
cluded are provisions establishing emission limitations, land-use and
transportation controls and monitoring devices.94
Under the federal standard-setting authorization, the EPA has issued
criteria and has published proposed national standards of maximum
allowable levels for six major pollutants-sulphur oxides, particulate
matter, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons and
91. Id. Before establishing the national standards, the EPA is required to allow a
reasonable time, not to exceed 90 days, for comment by interested parties. Id.
Thus, in reality, this opportunity for comment is the only means by which the states
involved can attempt to assist in setting the applicable air quality standards.
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (i) (Supp. 1972).
93. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4, 84 Stat. 1676. In
order for the state to adopt its own implementation plans it must, within 90 days
following the establishment of the national standards, hold public hearings regarding
the plans and submit the plans to the Administrator. It has been suggested that the
required public hearings offer a possible opportunity for effective participation by
citizens in the establishment of implementation plans. Comment, Federal Pollution
Control: Participation by States and Individuals Enhances the National Pollution Con-
trol Effort, 16 Vmr. L REv. 827 (1971).
94. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4, 84 Stat. 1676. If
any federal standards are violated, including the emission standards, the Adminis-
trator has the authority either to order abatement and later seek judicial relief
if the polluter fails to comply or to petition directly for a court order requiring the
defendant to abate his pollution-causing activity. Id. Polluters, however, are not
only subject to civil sanctions but are also subject to criminal penalties. If a
person is found to have knowingly violated a requirement of the implementation plan,
he may be fined not more than $25,000 per day or imprisoned for not more than one
yearorboth. Id. § 113(c)(1)(A).
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nitrogen oxides.9 5 Other pollutants, including fluorides, polycyclic
organic matter and odorous substances, are currently being evaluated
for national treatment and the list may well be increased. 6
Based upon the comments presented at public hearings conducted
with respect to these federal standards, it would appear, at least for
some industrial establishments, that compliance is going to be diffi-
cult and costly.9 7 It seems certain that if the standards are to be met,
state implementation plans must impose strict limitations on industrial
emissions at particular sources or classes of sources. 8 These limita-
tions may have to go beyond what has heretofore been proposed as ac-
ceptable emission levels.
This stricter level of compliance plus express statutory direction that
implementation plans be revised when necessary to reflect changes in
the standards themselves or improvements in control methods"9 clearly
foretells ever-increasing costs for all industries in fighting pollution.10
95. In the introductory notice of the proposed standards, it is explained that (1)
sulphur oxides arise primarily from the combustion of sulphur containing fossil fuels;
(2) particulate matter refers to solid or liquid matter dispersed in the air which is
smaller than 500 microns. Matter smaller than 1 micron in diameter is formed princi-
pally through condensation and combustion, while larger particles arise principally
through erosion and abrasion; (3) carbon monoxide is the product of incomplete com-
bustion of carbonaceous fuels; (4) photochemical oxidants are produced in the at-
mosphere when reactive organic substances, principally reactive hydrocarbons, and nitro-
gen oxides are exposed to sunlight (these oxidants result in the formulation of photo-
chemical smog); (5) hydrocarbons are molecules made up of hydrogen and carbon;
they are primarily associated with the processing, marketing, and use of petroleum
products; and (6) nitrogen oxides result from the fixation of nitrogen and oxygen at
high temperatures and are usually associated with the combustion process. 36 Fed.
Reg. 1502 (1971).
In explaining the strictness of the standards, EPA Administrator William D. Ruckels-
haus stated:
The legislative history of the Clean Air Act makes it plain that when we talk
about protecting the public health against polluted air we are talking about pro-
tecting those citizens who are particularly sensitive to it-in other words, those
citizens already afflicted with cardio-respiratory problems. If we have erred at
all in setting these standards, we have erred on the side of public health. L.A.
Times, May 1971, at 1, col. 5.
96. 36 Fed. Reg. 1515 (1971).
97. 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., CtmRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1264 (1971).
98. Id. at 1161.
99. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4, 84 Stat. 1676.
100. The President's Council on Environmental Quality estimates that industry must
invest 8 billion dollars in air pollution control between 1970 and 1975. The EPA esti-
mates that $3.1 billion will be required for new waste water treatment facilities by 1975.
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 9, 1971, at 4, col. 1 (Midwest ed.).
For a discussion concerning industry's ability to solve pollution problems internally
see Van Doren, Air Pollution: Expanding Citizens Remedies, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 16, 17-21
(1971). Professor Van Doren cites not only the inability of industry to control pollu-
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An industry spokesman in a recent speech said that this cost "pill will
be bitter in varying degrees and may be very serious for marginal
operations."''1  He graphically emphasized the necessity of top man-
agement's involvement by saying that "pollution sits as a director on
all corporate boards in 1971 and for the future."'102
A further encroachment on state jurisdiction results from another
1970 amendment'03 which provides for the establishment of federal
standards of performance for new stationary sources falling within cate-
gories determined by EPA to be significant contributors to air pollution
endangering public health or welfare.'04 Such standards of performance
are to reflect emission limitations achievable by the application of the
best system of emission reduction, taking into account the cost. 0 5 New
sources are those upon which construction or modification is started
subsequent to the date of publication of proposed regulations prescrib-
ing standards of performance. 08 Modification means any physical or
operational change, made after said publication date, in any existing
source which increases or adds any air pollutants.
0 7
Additionally, the amendment increases federal authority to deal
with hazardous air pollutants which are not regulated by present air
quality standards and which may cause an increase in illness or mor-
tality.'08 Cadmium and beryllium probably fall within this category.
The EPA is directed to compile a list of such pollutants and to formu-
tion without legal assistance, but also expresses skepticism concerning the effectiveness of
administrative agencies. In his view a responsive judiciary offers the most promising
means of accomplishing pollution control. Id. at 21-25. The New York case of
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970), exemplifies, in Professor Van Doren's opinion, the reluctance of the courts to
look beyond the private litigation to broad public objectives. In Boomer, while the
court affirmed a finding of nuisance and damage to plaintiff's property from defendant's
cement plant which emitted dirt, smoke, and vibrations, it denied the granting of an in-
junction which would have closed down the plant until the condition was abated. For
an analysis of the Boomer decision, see Comment, Air Pollution, Nuisance Law, and
Private Litigation, 1971 UTAH L. REv. 142. Compare Boomer with Renkin v. Harvey
Aluminum Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963) (injunction granted prohibiting de-
fendant from emitting harmful fluorides onto plaintiff's land and trees).
101. Robert D. Reed, Vice President of John Zink Co. of Tulsa, Oklahoma, in an
address before the Natural Gas Processors Assn. on air pollution. Platt's Oilgram
News Service, March 17, 1971, at 4.
102. Id.
103. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-6 (Supp. 1972).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 1857c-6(a)(1).
106. Id. § 1857c-6(a)(2).
107. Id. § 1857-6(a)(4).
108. Id. § 1857c-7.
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late federal emission limitations for each. 10 9
The furor over lead in gasoline resulted in authorization to the EPA,
under both the earlier law and the 1970 amendments, to require
registration of any fuel or fuel additive designated by it.110 To register
such a fuel the refiner must submit its commercial name, the name of
the manufacturer of any additive, and the additive's range of concentra-
tion and purpose.'"-
Under the earlier law, registration was automatic upon compliance
with these requirements."' Under the 1970 amendments, however,
the EPA may also require the refiner to conduct tests to determine pub-
lic health effects and to submit such other information as EPA may
deem reasonable and necessary to identify the emissions resulting from
the use of the fuel or additive and the effect thereof on vehicular emis-
sion control equipment and on public health or welfare. 1 3 The agency
may control or prohibit the use of any fuel or additive if its emission
will endanger health or welfare or will interfere with the performance
of emission control devices. 1 4  After the EPA has taken any action
controlling or prohibiting the use of any fuel or additive, the states are
precluded from similarly regulating fuel composition unless their regu-
lations are identical with those of the federal government or unless their
regulations are approved by the EPA as necessary to achieve national
air quality standards. 1 5 As in the case of motor vehicle emissions,
California was given a similar exemption which permits it to impose
stricter standards with respect to fuel composition." 6
"Il. NoisE POLLUTION
Whether noise 1 7 is, strictly speaking, an emission or a pollutant, there
is no doubt that its contribution to our environment is a major one.
In addition to being held responsible for loss of hearing, increased men-
tal stress and heart attacks, noise also may have permanently damaging
effects on unborn babies." 8
109. Id.
110. Id. § 1857f-6c.
111. Id. § 1857f-6c(b).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. § 1857f-6c(c).
115. Id.
116. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 9, 84 Stat. 1676.
117. "Noise" may be defined as sound that is not wanted by those who hear it.
HANDBOOK ON NOISE CONTROL 1-11 (Harris ed. 1957).
118. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
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Actions for nuisance1 19 have long been the common law approach
to the control of land usage and emissions. 120  Nuisance actions have
been allowed in situations where the plaintiff-receptors complained of
loud noises,12 ' unpleasant odors,122 excessive light, 23 or high tempera-
ture emissions.' 24 A plaintiff seeking relief'25 must show that the de-
fendant-emitter is using his land unreasonably and that this activity in-
terferes with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. 20  The issue
of unreasonableness is generally a question of fact 27 which necessitates
a consideration of fluctuating factors such as the locality in which the
act occurred, the character of the surroundings, and the social value
of the emitter's activities. 28  The application of these factors could
give rise to the anomalous situation wherein the receptor suffers
egregious effects from the emissions but is denied relief by the trier of
fact's finding that the emitter's use is reasonable. 129  Because large
119. For a discussion of the law of nuisance see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
571-612 (4th ed. 1971); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 64-92 (1956).
120. The action for private nuisance, as a tort, goes back at least to the thirteenth
century. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 64 (1956).
121. Guarina v. Bogart, 407 Pa. 307, 180 A.2d 557 (1962). See also Spater, Noise
and the Law, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1373 (1965).
122. Sarraillon v. Stevenson, 153 Neb. 182, 43 N.W.2d 509 (1950); Johnson v. Drys-
dale, 66 S.D. 436, 285 N.W. 301 (1939).
123. Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan Corp., 95 N.J. Eq. 188, 122 A.2d 749 (1923).
124. Grady v. Wolsner, 46 Ala. 381 (1871).
125. The traditional remedy for nuisance consisted of an award for damages as com-
pensation for the loss or injury sustained. Equity courts required a plaintiff to estab-
lish his rights in the property in an action at law before they would consider granting an
injunction to abate the nuisance. Today, however, one may seek both damages and
an injunction in one action. In deciding whether to grant an injunction, the court will
balance the relative hardship to the defendant against the probable benefit to the plain-
tiff. Oftentimes, damages will be awarded and an injunction denied. 1 F. HARaER &
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 90-91 (1956).
In Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp., 254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949), the
plaintiff received damages for the decrease in his property value caused by low flights
from a private airport. Substantial damage awards for personal injury are not common,
but the plaintiff in Dixon v. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517
(1944), received a verdict of $2000 for drugs, medical bills and demonstrated general
loss of health in addition to the award for property damage which resulted from con-
tinuous blasting at the defendant's quarry. Cases where injunctions were granted in-
clude: Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932); Anderson v.
Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952); Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp.,
254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949). But see McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan
Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F. 927 (9th Cir. 1908).
126. See, e.g., Louisville Refining Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1960).
127. Id.; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826-31 (1939).
128. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 596-602 (4th ed. 1971).
129. "The plaintiff may be required to submit to a minor annoyance, such as. . . a
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industrial emitters may be in a position to stress the ameliorative eco-
nomic impact they have on the locality as a factor to be weighed in their
favor, °30 they may, in effect, be able to discount the magnitude of their
emissions and thus escape liability.
While nuisance actions are adequate in determining relative rights in
land, as a noise abatement instrument they produce random relief since
emitter use evaluations remain largely subjective. What is needed today
is a tangible and convenient physical measurement of sound. This cali-
bration would facilitate the establishment of absolute maximum emis-
sion regulation. More importantly, this measurement would minimize
the need to rely upon opinion evidence in assessing whether emissions
are excessive. Several measurement procedures have been developed in
an effort to predict the human response to varying quantities and quali-
ties of noise. The fundamental measurement of sound is its loudness,
which is expressed in decibel units.13' The placing of limits on decibel
emission levels as a method of regulating noise is gaining legislative and
administrative support.'32
In May, 1969, the Department of Labor issued standards under the
Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act limiting noise levels on the premises
of government contractors to specific decibel ratings. 133  Later in the
same year the Federal Aviation Administration promulgated aircraft
noise standards using the decibel scale.' The Occupational Safety
and Health Act, enacted at the close of 1970, authorized the Depart-
ment of Labor to promulgate occupational safety and health standards
applicable to all employees of employers engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce.135 Noise certainly falls within the ambit of this statute and
slight amount of noise and smoke, ...where a greater one would be considered a
nuisance." Id. at 597.
130. Id. at 597-98.
131. A decibel is equal to one tenth of a bel. As explained in Beranek, Noise,
ScimErnic AMEmCAN, Dec. 1966, at 69:
Zero on the decibel scale indicates the barely audible sound produced by a pres-
sure of 0.0002 microbar (one microbar equals one dyne per square centimeter, or
about a millionth of a standard atmosphere) alternating at the rate of 1,000 cycles
per second. Sound intensity increases exponentially and a 10-decibel sound is only
twice as loud as a one-decibel sound, but a 20-decibel sound is four times louder
and a 100-decibel sound is 1000 times louder.
Other measurement procedures include the perceived noise level (PNdb) and the
composite noise response (CNR), and are intended to reflect increased psychological
responses to high frequency and long duration emissions.
132. See generally Greenwald, Law of Noise Pollution, 1 BNA ENmONMNNTL
REP., CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS, Monograph No. 2 (1970).
133. 41 C.F.R. § 50-204.10 (1971).
134. 14 C.F.R. § 36.1 (1971).
135. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590.
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when standards are issued they undoubtedly will encompass noise. The
language of the Act indicates that, wherever practicable, tangible criteria
and the performance desired should be expressed in the standard. 80
On a broader scale, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 established
within the EPA an Office of Noise Abatement and Control which was
given the directive to conduct a complete investigation of noise and its
effects upon public health and welfare.13 7  The emphasis of the study
is on objectivity with the goal of identifying and classifying causes and
sources of noise and determining their effects at various levels and on
humans, wildlife and property.
This study program would be implemented by a federal standard-
setting procedure under an Administration bill now pending in Con-
gress.138  Its immediate aim would be the development of noise criteria
reflecting the scientific knowledge most useful in identifying effects on
public health and welfare from noise.' 39 If such criteria identify con-
struction equipment, transportation equipment or equipment powered
by internal combustion engines as major sources of noise, the EPA
would be authorized to prescribe federal standards to limit their noise-
generating characteristics.' 4  This type of enactment would have little,
if any, effect on normal refinery operations. In fact, such operations
apparently cause few problems under either the common law reasonable-
ness test or the emerging physical measurement test based on decibel
levels. Exceptions may exist, however, particularly when refineries
are close to residential areas. Furthermore, refiners should expect
that noise standards, like so many others in the environmental field,
will probably become stricter.
14 1
IV. ODOR POLLUTION
Although the Federal Clean Air Act contains no definition of air
pollutants, the courts have held that the term includes offensive odors.'
42
The EPA obviously shares this view as indicated by its recent announce-
ment that it is evaluating odorous substances for possible coverage by
136. Id. § 6(b)(5).
137. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 14, 84 Stat. 1709.
138. S. 1016, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
139. Id. § 5.
140. Id. § 6.
141. For an interesting compilation of articles dealing with the various legal quiddi-
ties of noise pollution, see NoisE POLLUtroN AND THE LAW (Hildebrand ed. 1970).
142. E.g., United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
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national standards. 143 Odors, like noise, have been held to be nuisances
under both statutory and common law definitions.4 Damages will
be awarded or injunctions issued if the odors are so noxious or offensive
that they render the enjoyment of life or property uncomfortable to
people of ordinary sensibilities. 4 ' It is not necessary for such people
to prove that they became physically ill or were literally driven from
their homes. The question in a nuisance case, as one court framed it,
is whether the odor polluted the air so that the plaintiff's property was
rendered substantially unfit for comfortable enjoyment. 46
Unlike noise, however, which can be objectively and scientifically
measured on a decibel scale, no comparable method exists for measur-
ing odors. 47 Some success has been reported with an odor unit evalu-
ator called a scentometer but a nose is still required to evaluate the
results. 148  Therefore, in litigation and in administrative proceedings
involving odors, measurements of offensiveness are typically made sub-
jectively by panels, odor evaluators, by governmental inspectors, or by
citizen witnesses. 4  Attempts have been made to calibrate odors in ac-
cordance with threshold level tables which denominate the point at which
a particular scent is barely perceptible. Higher concentrations are tabu-
lated in terms of odor units, which are defined as the number of dilutions
of odor-free air required to reduce a particular odorous concentration to
its threshold value. From this type of measurement, experts are able to
express in unitary figures the acceptable odor levels for residential areas.
With all of these attempts at objectivity, however, the very subjective
human nose is still needed to evaluate the dilution strength required to
reduce an odor down to its threshold level. Certainly, no instrument
143. Reorganization Plan, supra note 22.
144. See note 122 and text accompanying notes 119-130.
145. Id.
146. Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas Light Co., 122 N.Y. 226, 25 N.E. 246 (1890).
147. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. AND WELFARE, AIR POLLUnON ENGINEEEING MANUAL 861 (J. Danielson ed.
1967).
148. Id. A scentometer is an apparatus filled with small granules of charcoal which
act as a filtering media. The device is equipped with holes of decreasing areas and
has a connection through which a person operating it may inhale ambient air which
has passed into the holes and through the charcoal filter. The number and size of the
holes which must be closed until the person operating the machine can no longer
detect an odor correlates to a scale of odor intensity. While results of such tests are
somewhat unreliable due to the varying degrees of sensitivity of its users, it should be
remembered that particular compounds producing odor such as hydrogen sulfide and
sulphur dioxide may be measured more exactly using chemical analysis. See Huey,
Broering, Jutze & Gruber, Objective Odor Pollution Control Investigations, 10 J. Am
POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 442 (1960).
149. Cf. id. at 441.
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is as readily available, needs so little replacement, is as portable, and
is as completely tied into a computer, as the human nose.
Because the sensitivity of the nose varies from person to person, al-
most any industrial enterprise runs the risk of having complaints made
against its operations because of alleged noxious odors. This has hap-
pened and will continue to happen to petroleum refiners although major
odor problems are apparently not a serious issue in the refining industry.
Odors associated with minor releases from refineries of unusual com-
pounds sometimes prompt such complaints from nearby residents. The
best protections against sensitive noses are good maintenance and oper-
ating practices designed to control odors which might be emitted from
leaking equipment.
V. FLARE AND GLARE POLLUTION
Flare at refinery locations can be a nighttime annoyance during start-
ing-up operations or when process upsets occur, resulting in pronounced
flame increases.150 General refinery illumination may also be a neigh-
borhood inconvenience after dark. 5' Neither may be serious enough
to warrant successful attacks as nuisances, although in a recent 1970
case it was held that floodlights illuminating a neighborhood play-
ground until 10 o'clock at night may be a nuisance if under the same
tests applicable to noises and odors, they annoy or disturb others in the
free use, possession or enjoyment of their property or render its ordi-
nary use or occupation physically uncomfortable. 52  Therefore, shield-
ing of nighttime illumination and locating flares on those portions of
refinery premises removed from residential areas may be good insurance.
VI. THERMAL POLLUTION
Finally, there is the growing problem of thermal pollution. 5 3 Al-
though this is primarily a concern of the power-generating industry,
particularly nuclear plants, other industrial operations also contribute
waste heat to our waterways.154 The disposal of refinery cooling-tower
150. THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATIoN-THE
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIEs 94-95 (1971).
151. Id.
152. Rogers v. City of Miami Springs, 231 So.,2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App. 1970).
153. In New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170, 171 (Ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969), the court stated that the term "'thermal
pollution' is used to designate the effects on a river-its water, flora and fauna-of
the injection of heated water."
154. Bloom, Heat-A Growing Water Pollution Problem, 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT
REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, Monograph No. 4 (1970).
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water may in some cases present minor problems. The recent tempera-
ture standards for the Mississippi River agreed upon by the EPA and
the states bordering on the river may be of interest. They list maximum
monthly temperatures for designated stretches of the river and provide
that increases in water temperature from industrial discharges shall be
limited to 51F. above the usual temperature for the season of the year
or to the maximum monthly standard, whichever is lower.155  Similar
regulations dealing with thermal pollution either already exist or can
be anticipated in other parts of the country."'
VII. CITIZENS' SUITS
The vogue in environmental enforcement circles is the encouragement
of private citizens to act as prosecutors in our courts against alleged
polluters. 157  The State of Michigan was the pioneer in this endeavor.
It enacted a law in 1970 authorizing any person to sue alleged pollu-
tion violators, including the State itself or any political subdivision, in
order to enforce compliance with applicable environmental standards. 53
Under a law of this sort the plaintiff need not meet the requirement
that would otherwise be imposed of proving that he suffered some per-
sonal injury or property damage. He can sue merely for the fun of it,
although the fun may be somewhat mitigated by a provision in the
Michigan law authorizing the court to require a bond up to $500 to
protect the defendant against court costs if the plaintiff loses.
A similar type of citizen-suit authorization is contained in the federal
1970 Clean Air Amendments. 15 9 The federal provisions are, however,
somewhat more restrictive; they require the plaintiff to give 60 days'
notice of his intention to sue and forbid him from filing a separate com-
pliance proceeding if an official one has been started and is being dili-
gently prosecuted. 60 Even as so restricted, this federal enactment raises
serious questions because under the United States Constitution a litigant
has no standing to sue unless the action he challenges has caused him
155. 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1232 (1971).
156. For a comprehensive analysis of the problem of thermal pollution, see Comment,
Thermal Discharges: A Legal Problem, 38 TENN. L. REv. 369 (1971).
157. Moorman, Primer for the Practice of Federal Environmental Law, 1 BNA
ENVIRONMENTAL REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 892 (1971). See Comment, Quo
Warranto To Enforce a Corporate Duty Not To Pollute the Environment, 1 CALM.
ECOLOGY L.Q. 653 (1971), for a novel application of an ancient writ.
158. Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, 10 MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.528
(201-07) (Supp. 1971).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970), originally enacted as Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 15(a), 84 Stat. 1706.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(b) (1) (A) & (B) (1970).
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actual injury, economic or otherwise. 1 1 The word "otherwise" has
been liberally construed to include aesthetic, conservational and recrea-
tional values,"" but it may still be constitutionally necessary for a pri-
vate plaintiff to show that in trying to protect those values he personally
comes within the zone of interests protected by them. 03 To put this
issue in concrete terms, can a private plaintiff residing say in Florida
sue an industrial enterprise in the State of Washington for alleged pollu-
tion of Puget Sound? Under the 1970 law he can, subject to the condi-
tions previously discussed. However, the United States Constitution
may impose the further condition that the Florida plaintiff first show
how the alleged pollution in Washington personally affects him-eco-
nomically or otherwise. As a practical matter, this constitutional limita-
tion probably will be of little significance since the private citizens most
likely to sue under this type of statutory authorization will be those
directly affected as a result of residency in the vicinage of the question-
able activity.
More fearsome from the refiner's point of view are the laws giving
private informers a share of any fines or penalties assessed against con-
victed polluters. Looking at this development from an historical per-
spective, the Refuse Act becomes important once again. In proscrib-
ing any discharge of refuse into navigable waters, regardless of intent
or actual harm to navigation, it authorizes the convicting court to im-
pose a fine up to $2500, "one-half of said fine to be paid to the person
or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction."' 0 4  This
161. U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2. See generally Rheingold, A Primer on Environ-
mental Litigation, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 113, 115-19 (1971); Comment, Standing on
the Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescription for Citizen Participation, 1
CALIF. EcoLoGY L.Q. 561, 603-06 (1971).
162. Association of Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970),
citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965);
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 944, 1000-
06 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
163. Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971). See Sierra Club v. Morton, 40 U.S.L.W. 4397
(U.S. Apr. 19, 1972) (plaintiff organization held to lack standing to sue because of
failure to assert individualized harm to itself or members); Fisherman's Protective
Union v. St. Helens, 160 Ore. 654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939). Regarding standing as a prob-
lem in constitutional law, see Lutz v. McCaffrey, Standing on the Side of the Environ-
ment: A Statutory Proscription for Citizen Participation, 1 CALIF. ECOL. L.Q. 561
(1971); Rheingold, A Primer on Environmental Litigation, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 113,
115 (1971). See Comment, Federal Pollution Control: Participation by States and
Individuals Enhances the National Pollution Control Effort, 16 VILL. L. Rav. 827,
840-41 (1971), for a discussion of possible class action law suits under FED. R. CIv. P.
23.
164. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
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fine-splitting provision, which is mandatory, has been interpreted by one
federal judge as requiring payment of one-half of the penalty to an in-
former-employee who was himself involved in the activity that was pe-
nalized. 6" This type of encouragement to private citizens should, once
knowledge of it is widespread, produce more litigation since dollars,
and not injunctions, may be put in the bank.1
66
CONCLUSION
The drafting of legislation dealing with pollution is fraught with com-
165. United States v. Mobil Oil Co., Crim. No. 70-58 (S.D. Me. 1970).
166. Using 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970), ingenious plaintiffs can be expected to bring
suit under the ancient common law writ of qui tam. A qui tam action is defined as:
An action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a penalty
for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same shall
be recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who will
bring such action and the remainder to the state or some other institution. BLACK'S
LAw DicTioNARY 1414 (4th ed. 1968).
The qui tam action has "been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in
this country ever since the foundation of our Government." Marvin v. Trout,
199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (holding, inter alia, that an informer has the right to recover
the penalty under a state statute expressly providing that persons who lose money while
gambling may recover the same within 6 months); see United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 540-42 (1943) (upholding validity of federal statute which ex-
pressly allowed persons who instituted suit under a sister statute prohibiting fraudulent
bidding to collect one-half of the criminal fine). Nevertheless, while some writers
have expressed their belief that individual citizens can utilize section 41 to bring qui
tam actions against polluters and on behalf of the government (e.g., Puro, Water Pol-
lution Legislation and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: The Environmentalists
Point of View, 16 ST. Louis LJ. 63 (1971)), this private right of action has been
forcefully denied by the federal district courts. Gerbing v. I.T.T. Rayonier, Inc., 332
F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y of America v. Scholze
Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339, 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1971):
[T~he plaintiffs have no standing to maintain this action pursuant to 99 407 and
411 nor to recover the penalty provided by § 411 short of a successful criminal
prosecution. These statutes create and define crimes which may not be prosecuted
by private civil action. The designation of the action as a qui tam action does
not circumvent the conclusions reached for § 413 provides explicitly that the power
to enforce the provisions of H9 407 and 411 lies exclusively in the Department
of Justice, thereby precluding any private civil action for the recovery of the in-
former's moiety.
Thus, since private citizens have no power or authority to institute a civil action for
the enforcement of a penal statute, unless expressly so stated by the statute (cf. Marcus
and Marvin, supra), no right exists to enforce the Refuse Act. Accord, Enquist v.
Quaker Oats Co., 327 F. Supp. 347 (D.C. Neb. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y
of America v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.
Tex. 1971).
For a discussion concerning potential private actions for nuisance as a means of
combating water pollution, see Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis.
L. Rav. 738. In his article Professor Davis suggests that greater utilization of
legal actions alleging riparian rights would be of significant assistance in dealing with
water pollution.
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plexities. Meaningful and lasting laws require that significant expen-
ditures of time be devoted to the study of both legislative and technical
factors. 167  Skill is required to define pollutants adequately with under-
standable criteria and to devise meaningful standards and methods of
measuring industrial discharges. 108 These technical problems associ-
ated with pollution regulation are compounded when it is realized that
no single resource such as air or water is independent from the other
components of the environment. Care must be exercised so that the
proscriptions of one enactment do not work a cure worse than the di-
sease. For example, some precipitators designed to remove particu-
late matter from exhaust gases produce high noise levels in addition to
solid waste which must be disposed of in a proper manner.10 9 Another
very real problem which makes legislation in the field difficult is the
impact of environmental regulations on the ability of industry to supply
energy. Laws which require removal of wastes far below harmful levels
clearly represent a misallocation of our nation's resources.
7 0
The uncertainty of environmental standards is itself delaying pollution
abatement. A concomitant of the fact that much environmental legisla-
tion is yet to be passed is the marked decrease in manufacturing con-
struction while anti-pollution laws are being made firm. In spite of a
rising demand for petroleum products, the value of new construction
contracts in the industry plummeted to less than $300 million in 1970,
167. Cf. text accompanying notes 3-16 supra (noting that despite recent congressional
enactments over the past twenty years the Refuse Act of 1899 is still the major piece
of federal legislation in the field of water pollution).
168. A bill proposed by President Nixon and recently considered by Congress illus-
trates the importance and interplay of these legislative and scientific factors. The pro-
posed bill would have taxed sulfur emissions on a weight basis. Opponents of the bill
argued that criteria such as stack height, gas temperature, and exit velocity (which
determine ground elevation concentration levels) were not considered by the measure.
Other arguments propounded were that the tax could be passed to the consumers with-
out eliminating pollution and that a manufacturer might be required to pay the tax
while meeting federal standards defining pollution in all ways except on a weight basis.
1 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1097 (1971).
169. A striking example of solid waste accumulation involves the lime dolomite proc-
ess for removing sulfur oxides from power plant stack gases. While the process meets
the letter of the law, and has in fact formed the basis for some recent regulations, it
creates two pounds of solid waste for every pound of pollutant removed. Teller,
Pollution Control 1972: Soft Talk, But a Big Stick, in CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Jan. 24,
1972, at 54.
170. Dr. Laird, Director of the Interior's Office of Oil and Gas, in a speech on March
8, 1971, stated that one of the most important tasks of the immediate future is to edu-
cate the public about the correlation between energy and the environment. He noted
that the public must understand the impact of environmental concerns on the ability to
supply energy and the rising costs of supply to meet the required needs. 1 BNA EN-
VIRONMENT REP., CuRRENT DEvELoPmENTs 1246 (1971).
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compared with $360 million in 1969.171 The petroleum industry has
shown itself willing to expend vast sums of money to reduce pollution,
72
but the construction of more modem facilities which are relatively emis-
sion free is often held in abeyance pending legislative decision.
173
A coordinate of abatement legislation is the prospective use of our
courts as the vehicle to redress violation of anti-pollution laws through
the award of damages or injunctions. Much time will be lost and un-
certainty will result if the courts are not given clear statutory guidelines
within which to operate. Moreover, although remedies for environ-
mental abuse must be substantial enough to deter future conduct which
is similar in nature, they must not render uneconomic continued opera-
tion of an industry.
The media today is developing in Americans a national consciousness
of the necessity to take action to preserve our ecology. Although ad-
ditional anti-pollution legislation should be expected to flow from this
new awareness, the EPA already possesses the power and authority to
tackle our environmental problems. Any extant federal-state conflict
in laws does not permit much concern since these difficulties will ul-
timately be ironed out through mutual accommodation by assessing pri-
orities in acordance with the needs of each sovereign entity. The ef-
ficient enforcement of pollution laws will remain, as it now is, a direct
function of money, manpower and competing societal interests.
171. The bulk of the 1970 expenditures by the petroleum industry was for moderni-
zation of existing facilities rather than new installations, Los Angeles Times, June 13,
1971, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
172. The petroleum industry is spending more than $1.5 million per day to reduce
air and water pollution, according to the American Petroleum Institute. 1 BNA EN-
vIRoNMENT REP., CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1426 (1971).
173. The quandry confronting Jim Carson, Chief Environmental Engineer of Ohio
Edison Company, is worthy of mention. As soon as a $2 million electrostatic precipi-
tator was completed to remove 98% of their Newcastle, Pennsylvania plant's soot and
ash in compliance with Pennsylvania Air Pollution Regulation No. 4, Regulation No.
5 was passed. It requires 99% removal of soot and ash. Mr. Carson feels he could
junk the 98% precipitator and complete the 99% equipment (at a cost of $4 million)
by 1973, but fears that Pennsylvania will have sulfur emission regulations by then.
Precipitators use sulfur to pick up an electric charge that attracts the soot and ash.
The enactment of sulfur standards would render the 99% equipment unusable. The
company would then be forced to utilize a more sophisticated system costing $8 million
to $15 million, depending on the strictness of the future regulation. Ohio Edison is
presently asking the state for a variance at its Newcastle plant until the sulfur and par-
ticulate matter restrictions are clarified. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 23, 1970, at 1,
col. 6 (midwest ed.).
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